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Trial Tactics

Advocate Yes; Witness No
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

A

basic principle codified in Rule 3.7 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct is that a lawyer
generally cannot be both an advocate and a witness in the same case.

Rule 3.7 Lawyer as Witness
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value
of legal services rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client.
The rule applies to all lawyers in civil and criminal
cases and is equally applicable to prosecutors and defense
lawyers. Some courts, however, have expressed a special
concern that a government lawyer comply with the rule
because it “expresses an institutional concern, especially
pronounced when the government is a litigant, that public
confidence in our criminal justice system not be eroded
by even the appearance of impropriety.” (United States
v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 553 (9th Cir. 1985).)
In the typical criminal case it is unthinkable that the
prosecuting attorney or the defense lawyer would seek
to take the witness stand even if co-counsel were present to conduct an examination. But both prosecutors
and defense counsel must recognize that it is possible
for a lawyer to violate the ethical rule without ever
officially becoming a witness.

An Illustrative Case

One case that illustrates how this can happen is United
States v. Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir.
2014). The defendant was charged with and convicted
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of importation of marijuana. The first paragraph of the
court’s opinion summarizes the case in a very catchy
way, which is not unusual in opinions by Chief Judge
Alex Kozinski:
It is said that every dog has its day. Unfortunately
for Kevin Rangel-Guzman, the drug detection dog
at the Otay Mesa Port of Entry was having a fine
day on September 5, 2011, when Rangel-Guzman
and a friend attempted to re-enter the United States.
The dog alerted to their vehicle, and Customs and
Border Protection officers conducted a search. Officers found 91.4 kilograms of marijuana, hidden in
a compartment behind the backseat. Good dog!
(Id. at 1223)
On these facts it is easy to believe that the defense
of Rangel-Guzman was a challenge. It turns out that
both he and his friend gave statements to border agents
after their arrest. At trial, Rangel-Guzman testified to a
very different account from the one he provided to the
agents. He claimed at trial that (1) his Aunt Martha and
a cousin invited him a month before the arrest to a wedding in Tecate, Mexico, so (2) he took a bus from Los
Angeles to Tijuana and either a bus or taxi to Tecate and
(3) returned to Los Angeles the same way; then (4) he
decided to go back to Mexico to “have a good time,” at
which point (5) Aunt Martha loaned him a car that (6)
he and his friend drove to his cousin’s house in Tecate
and (7) took a side trip by cab before (8) returning to
Tecate to pick up the car. In short, his defense was “I
didn’t know there was marijuana in the car.”

The Problem

Prior to trial, the assistant US attorney who prosecuted the case had a meeting attended by Homeland
Security Agent Baxter, Rangel-Guzman, and Rangel-Guzman’s attorney. When Rangel-Guzman’s trial
testimony departed from what he had said in the meeting, the prosecutor questioned him in a way that made
clear that she believed he had made statements in the
meeting inconsistent with his testimony. She interrogated him as follows:
You told us that you and your mother ran into
Martha . . . You told us that four or five months
before . . . That’s what you told us last week . . .
Don’t you remember that I was shocked that you
were saying it was four to five months before you
got arrested?
(Id. at 1224.)
Although the prosecutor clearly was referring to her
reaction to what Rangel-Guzman said during the pretrial
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meeting, defense counsel failed to object. For the first
time on appeal, appellate counsel argued that the prosecutor improperly vouched and violated the advocate-witness
rule. The absence of a timely trial objection left RangelGuzman with the chance for only plain error review.
The court of appeals explained that it held government lawyers to a high standard when it came to the
advocate-witness rule:
We have previously found error where a prosecutor’s actions might have “tak[en] advantage of
the natural tendency of jury members to believe
in the honesty of . . . government attorneys” even
when those actions didn’t “fit neatly under either
the advocate-witness rule or the vouching rule.”
United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 922 (9th
Cir. 1998).
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)
The court concluded that the prosecutor “became
her own rebuttal witness” as it described her
cross-examination:
The prosecutor made a number of statements
that used variations on “but you told us” and
“I asked you and you said,” as well as assertions of fact about what had occurred during the
meeting: “Well, we went over and over it, Mr.
Rangel,” “[D]o you remember last week I specifically asked you multiple times who accompanied
you to the Quinceanera?” And she left no doubt
about her personal feelings during the meeting:
“Don’t you remember that I was shocked that
you were saying that it was four to five months
before you got arrested [that you met Martha]?”
(Id.)

Avoiding the Problem

The court explained how prosecutors can avoid the
advocate-witness problem, and its advice is equally
applicable to defense counsel:
When a prosecutor interviews a suspect prior to
trial, the “correct procedure” is to do so “in the
presence of a third person so that the third person
can testify about the interview.” United States v.
Watson, 87 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 1996). Here,
Agent Baxter was present for the interview, so
he could have taken the stand and testified that
Rangel-Guzman had made the prior inconsistent
statements. See United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d
455, 461 (9th Cir. 1972).
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)

Relying on the cases cited above, the court found
that the prosecutor violated the advocate-witness rule:
Instead of calling Baxter, the prosecutor became
her own rebuttal witness. By phrasing the questions as she did, she essentially testified that
Rangel-Guzman had made those prior inconsistent
statements. Doing so clearly took “advantage of
the natural tendency of jury members to believe”
in a prosecutor, Edwards, 154 F.3d at 922, and
required the jury to “segregate the exhortations of
the advocate from the testimonial accounts of the
witness,” Prantil, 764 F.2d at 553. And, because
the prosecutor wasn’t actually a witness, RangelGuzman had no opportunity to cross-examine her
about the accuracy or truthfulness of her account.
There can be no doubt that the AUSA was asking
the jury to choose whether to believe her or the
defendant. This was highly improper and unfair
to the defendant.
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)

The Remedy and Lessons Learned

The government conceded that the prosecutor had
violated the advocate-witness rule in her cross-examination, and the court commented favorably on the
government’s response to the violation:
After oral argument before us, the United States
Attorney “concede[d] that [the] cross-examination of defendant was error” and advised us
that she “has instituted—in addition to existing training—a semi-monthly training update
for the Criminal Division regarding pre-trial and
trial phases . . . in which prosecutorial error may
occur.” We commend the United States Attorney
for the Southern District of California for her
forthrightness and hope that her example will
be followed by prosecutors across the circuit.
(Id.)
The court also chose to emphasize the importance
of trial judges enforcing the advocate-witness rule:
We recognize the difficulty in identifying errors
absent an objection. And we understand the district court’s reluctance to intervene when the
opposing party, perhaps strategically, declines to
do so. But the prosecutor’s invocation of her own
personal knowledge during cross-examination
was unquestionably improper. Even absent objection, the court should have recognized this and put
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a stop to it. See Henderson v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 1121, 1129–30, 185 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2013).
(Rangel-Guzman, 752 F.3d at 1225.)
In the end, the court found that the prosecutor’s
erroneous questioning did not violate Rangel-Guzman’s substantial rights. The court concluded that
there was no reason to believe that the jury would
have believed his “convoluted tale” had there been
no improper cross-examination. This, of course, is an
application of the plain-error standard, which demands
more of an appellant than can be delivered in most
cases. The lesson for defense counsel is to make proper
objections when there is a violation of the advocatewitness rule. A proper objection might have ended the

improper examination and, even if it did not, the standard on appeal would have been more favorable to the
defendant/appellant.
So, there is something that all involved in criminal
cases can learn from this case:
1. Prosecutors can violate the advocate-witness rule
without ever taking the witness stand.
2. Trial judges must be alert to protect against violations of the rule.
3. Defense counsel also must be alert to detect violations, must make timely and proper objections,
and must understand that they violate their duty
to clients when they fail to recognize that a crossexamination has become a kind of rebuttal that
makes the prosecutor a witness. n
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